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INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN THE PROCESS OF 
ECONOMIC GROWTH OF THE 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA* 
YUAN-LI Wu 
INTRODUCTION 
Economic Benefits - Distribution and Growth 
1 
Analysis of economic development in quantitative aggregates 
would be woefully incomplete if one were to ignore the distribution 
of benefits of development. If we compare the GNP, a frequently 
used quantitative measure of economic welfare, to a pie, successful 
economic development will make the pie larger, as has been amply 
demonstrated in the case of Taiwan. However, since a growing 
"pie" is not produced merely as an object of wonderment, to be 
admired in the abstract but not to be touched by anyone, how the 
pie is sliced and how and when the slices are made available to 
individual members of the society are an inalienable part of 
economic development. Success or failure of the development 
process must, therefore, be judged from the points of view of both 
production and distribution. 
Some students of economic development have even gone so far 
as to suggest that a single index of economic development might 
be constructed that would automatically take into account both 
aspects1 so that when the index is employed in choosing from 
among economic policies and assessing their results, the best 
policies chosen will automatically take both goals into account. 
For instance, one might divide the population into five (or any 
other number of) income classes in descending order of income 
size, each class to consist of one-fifth (or quintile) of the total 
population. One might then choose to consider a 1% increase in 
income of the lowest fifth of the population to be equivalent to a 
multiple of a 1% increase in the income of the highest one-fifth, 
and so forth for the other income intervals. If such a weighting 
system is adopted in calculating the result, a policy to achieve 
* This paper is the advance draft of a chapter to be included in a 
forthcoming symposium in memory of Ta-chung Liu. Printed with the permission 
of the author and the editors. 
1. See Montek S. Ahluwalia and Hollis Chenery, "The Economic Frame-
work," Chapter II in Hollis Chenery, Montek S. Ahluwalia, C.L.G. Bell, John H. 
Dulay and Richard Jolly, Redistribution with Growth (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1974). A. K. Sen has actually developed such a measure. See his "Real 
National Income," Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 43, No. 1 (February 1976): 19· 
39. 
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high economic growth would automatically tend to favor an 
accelerated increase in the income of the poorest one-fifth of the 
population. Conversely, a policy favoring the poorest segment of 
the population in income distribution would tend to yield a higher 
calculated rate of growth even if the absolute increase in output 
were constant. 
The choice of weights in constructing such a comprehensive 
index of development (i.e., including objectives in both production 
and distribution) must in the final analysis rest on value 
judgments, and a decision on this basis can be reached only as a 
part of the society's political process, with the term "political" 
being construed in a very broad sense, including both ideological 
considerations and practical (i.e., institutional and other) con-
straints. However, before we proceed further, let us remind 
ourselves of some of the relationships between production and 
distribution in general, as well as the object of distribution. 
First, the nature of the economic development strategy 
followed will inevitably affect the pattern of income distribution, 
which is a major component of the distribution of benefits in 
general. For instance, an industry-first policy will initially and 
directly create more income for those in industry- owners as well 
as workers - and for those in both industry and non-industry 
who sell to the industrial sector. Alternatively, an agriculture-first 
strategy would have the corresponding primary effect on those 
engaged in agriculture and in industries supplying agriculture. 
Moreover, whether the development strategy aims at achieving 
self-sufficiency or is export-orientated is another major channel of 
causal relationship that directionally runs from production to 
distribution. Still another element in development strategy which 
has causal relationship running from production to distribution is 
the choice between labor-intensive and capital-intensive methods 
of production. 
Second, a major determinant of the rate of expansion of 
production is capital formation. Since private capital formation in 
a market economy, even when there is an inflow of foreign capital, 
is largely determined by the ayailability of domestic private 
savings, the distribution of income, which could affect savings, 
can influence the rate of increase of aggregate production, 
although, according to some students, the propensity of thrift may 
not vary as much between the rich and the poor in Taiwan as one 
might be inclined to believe a priori. Furthermore, the pattern of 
income distribution will also affect the composition of market 
demand for goods, and, therefore, the demand for inputs and the 
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rate at which production in the aggregate can expand. Here the 
causal relationship is directionally reversed; the linkage is from 
distribution to production. 
A third linkage between production and distribution has to do 
with the effect of the distributive pattern of economic benefits on 
the institutional framework and socio-political environment 
within which production takes place. If this environment is hostile 
to the orderly planning and execution of economic activities, 
production will not expand rapidly or steadily. Since no economic 
system can realistically expect the benefits (and cost) of produc-
tion to be shared absolutely equally by every member of the 
society, whether the distributive pattern will lead to the emergence 
of groups whose interests are mutually antagonistic becomes a 
critical issue to social and political stability. For example, a 
particular development strategy might consistently favor urban 
dwellers and discriminate against rural residents so that rural-
urban antagonism will in due course arise as an outcome of 
opposition of economic interests. Antagonism may also stem from 
conflicting economic interests between farmers and non-farmers, 
between new immigrants and earlier settlers (e.g., the Chinese in 
Malaysia versus the Malays under the Bumiputra program), 
between those who were initially rich and those who were initially 
poor, and so forth. If the economic development strategy followed 
tends to create such antagonistic groups, the latter would work 
against the emergence of political consensus which is needed for 
an effective economic policy, including measures to modify the 
distributive pattern that would otherwise prevail. Effective 
implementation of the income tax, subsidies, and other forms of 
income transfer, is more likely if a reasonable degree of consensus 
can be developed. The same issue can also be formulated in terms 
of the effect of a particular distributive pattern on socio-political 
homogeneity. 
Economic interest groups that could become mutually antago-
nistic may overlap. For example, there could be one conflict of 
economic interests between farmers and non-farmers and another 
between two linguistic or ethnic groups, yet each of the latter may 
include both farmers and non-farmers. In the Taiwan context, in 
addition to the usual farmer-non-farmer division, we must also 
look into the relative positions of the post-1945 settlers (commonly 
described as "mainlanders") and the pre-1945 settlers (commonly 
described as "Taiwanese"), who, or whose forebears, came to 
Taiwan in earlier times. 
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Economic Benefits and Non-economic Values 
The preceding remarks have focused attention on the 
interrelationships between economic growth and the distribution 
of economic benefits_ However, man does not live by bread alone. 
A longer life in good health, better education, more congenial 
working conditions, stable employment, and, last but not least, a 
greater measure of personal freedom are easily among the 
desiderata that many would wish to attain. Since economic 
development is only one aspect of development, and since with 
economic development many other variables will also change, two 
questions immediately arise. First, what other variables might 
usefully serve as indicators of socio-political-economic develop-
ment other than the sheer volume of output?2 Discussion of the 
importance of distribution in addition to production can be viewed 
as a variant of this question, the scope of which can be expanded 
to cover non-economic values. Second, what are the interrelation-
ships among these different variables? In particular, how might 
the pattern of distribution of economic benefits affect that of non-
economic values and vice-versa? 
Clearly, the development of Taiwan can and should be 
analyzed also from this broader perspective. [This is discussed in 
a later chapter of the book from which this chapter is excerpted -
ed.] Nevertheless we might note in this connection that, a priori, 
one can envisage the interrelationships between the distributive 
patterns of two such variables both as supportive of each other 
and as substitutes. Thus, as time passes, a more equitable 
distribution of educational opportunities is likely to lead to greater 
equality of economic opportunities and, therefore, of income. 
Conversely, a more equitable income distribution is likely to lead 
to a more equitable distribution of education.3 In a more static 
2. See, for instance, Adelman and Morris, Society, Politics and Economic 
Development: A Quantitative Approach (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1967), and D. V. McGranahan, C. Richard-Proust, N. V. Sovani and M. 
Subramanian, Contents and Measurement of Socioeconomic Development (New 
York: Praeger, 1972). For a discussion on Taiwan in this respect, see Charles H. C. 
Kao, "Development Indicators and their Implications for Taiwan's Economic 
Development," Industry of Free China, Taipei: Economic Planning Council, Vol. 
XXXXI, No. 5 (May 1974). 
3. These propositions are predicated on the assumption that the initial level 
of educational opportunities is sufficiently high so that their greater availability 
would benefit the recipients. Similarly, in the second case, the initial level of 
income must be sufficiently high if a more equal distribution is to be beneficial. A 
more equal distribution of very little income (or of educational opportunities) would 
hardly increase the potential availability of more educational opportunities (or of 
income). 
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sense, it is quite plausible that at a given time those who are at 
the lower end of income distribution could regard greater 
educational opportunities, such as special scholarships, as 
partially making up the disadvantage they suffer in income 
distribution. The initial disadvantage could be viewed as tempor-
ary, and more future advantage may be traded for less present 
advantage. 
Of all the non-economic values to which people aspire, 
perhaps the most fundamental is the sharing of political decision-
making power which can result in a more equitable "allocation" of 
all other "values." Consider now the relationship between the 
distributive patterns of income - representing all economic 
benefits - and of political power- representing all non-economic 
values. On the one hand, those who do not enjoy an equal share of 
political power may regard a more than equal share of income as 
an adequate compensation, at least in the short run, and vice 
versa. On the other hand, as equity in the distribution of political 
power increases, it is likely to be used to increase equity in income 
distribution.4 By the same token, as income distribution becomes 
4. 
1 
Increasing 
political 
equality 
Increasing 
income equality 
In the above diagram Point A represents total inequality in both income 
distribution and the distribution of political power. Point D, on the other hand, 
denotes complete equality in both respects. Point C represents complete political 
equality together with complete economic inequality in distribution. At the other 
end, Point B represents complete economic equality with complete political 
inequality. The proposition advanced in the text is that both B and C are 
essentially unstable situations. As political equality increases, for instance, 
through the evolution of democratic institutions, it is likely that the more equally 
distributed political power will be used to promote economic equality. This 
essentially is in accord with the thesis advanced by Simon Kuznets in his 1955 
paper on the tendency toward greater income equality during the later stages of 
economic development following the establishment of political democracy. See also 
Simons Kuznets, "Demographic Components in Size-distribution of Income" 
(Papers and Proceedings of the Seminar sponsored by the Japan Economic 
Research Center and The Council for Asian Manpower Studies, December 16-20, 
Vol. II, July 1975). On the other hand, Point B is also unstable because the 
population that shares economic benefit and power equally among its members 
will probably be unwilling to support the smaller group holding political power in a 
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more equal, barring the existence of a totally authoritarian 
government,5 it will become increasingly improbable for inequity 
in the distribution of political power to prevail inasmuch as such 
an inequity will become progressively harder and more costly to 
support. [These issues are also discussed fully in the next chapter 
- ed.] 
Finally, the distribution of the benefits of economic develop-
ment is, of course, only one side of distribution. The obverse is the 
distribution of development costs, which one might regard as 
negative benefits. Unfortunately, it is not possible to net the 
benefits or costs of economic development for individual members 
or groups of the society. Rather the two aspects must be 
considered separately. Since consideration of the distribution of 
the costs of development would require a detailed examination of 
the sources of private savings and of the financing of government 
capital formation, which would take us far afield, we will confine 
our discussion in this paper to an account of income distribution 
and how changes in the pattern have come about. 
INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN TAIWAN 
Distribution by Income Class - A Preliminary International 
Comparison with Developed and Less Developed Countries 
According to an IBRD study on income distribution in less 
developed countries6 (LDCs), the typical pattern to be found in an 
LDC is as shown in Table 1. 
highly concentrated form. Such a situation would seem to require the use of force 
by those holding political power in order to maintain their own authority. 
Our hypothesis suggests that the two kinds of equality can to some degree be 
traded in order to maintain the same level of satisfaction for individual segments 
of the population. This is illustrated by the "indifference curves" shown in the 
diagram. At the same time, it is also our hypothesis that increase in either income 
(or political) equality is likely to facilitate further increases in political (or income) 
equality. The movement in the direction from A to D, as denoted by the arrow in 
the diagram, tends to become progressively easier, at least for a part of the way. 
This part of Kuznets' hypothesis may be true even if his argument that economic 
development in its early stages leads to greater inequality may not hold. The point 
raised by Oshima in "Income Inequality and Economic Growth, the Postwar 
Experience of Asian Countries," in The Malayan Economic Review, Vol. XV, No.2 
October 1970), is further substantiated in our discussion in the text. 
5. One may note in this connection Mao Tse-Tung's concern about the 
periodic recurrence of "revisionist tendencies" in mainland China which would 
give rise to greater income inequality especially as the lower incomes remain at an 
extremely low level absolutely. 
6. Chenery et al., op. cit., pp. XVI and 40. 
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Table 1. Income Distribution in LDCs 
Percent of total Households 
Arranged in Descending 
Order of Income 
Highest 20';7, 
2nd 20":, 
:krl 20% 
4th 20'!\, 
Lowest 20 ~. 
Percent of Total Income 
sa 
22 
13 
7 
5 
Total 100 
Sixty-six developed and underdeveloped countries that had 
data on income distribution were examined by the author and 
classified into three groups: (1) "high inequality" (income share of 
the lowest, i.e., poorest, 40% of all households being less than 12%); 
(2) "moderate inequality" (income share of the lowest 40%, 
between 12 and 17%); (3) "low inequality" 7 (income share of the 
lowest 401fo, 17% and above). Each of the three groups was further 
divided into three subsets according to the level of per capita 
income. See Table 2. 
Of the 66 countries included in the IBRD study, ten are in 
East, Southeast and South Asia.R In terms of GNP per capita, 
Japan is the most developed of these ten while Sri Lanka, India, 
Pakistan and Burma, all in South Asia, with Burma also 
straddling Southeast Asia, are the poorest. The remaining five, 
including Taiwan, Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philip-
pines fall within a relatively narrow range and are all in East or 
Southeast Asia. For comparison, the respective income distribu-
tion patterns of these Asian countries, as given by Chenery et al., 
can be seen in Table 3. 
As far as Taiwan is concerned, especially noteworthy are (1) 
the virtually identical pattern of its income distribution with that 
of Japan, (2) the close approximation of the Taiwan and Japanese 
patterns to that of the United States, and (3) the slightly larger 
share of the lowest 40% on the income ladder in the Taiwan and 
Japanese distributions as compared with the other Asian 
countries of low inequality, or, for that matter, as compared with 
the United States. 
7. Montek Ahluwalia, "Income Inequality: Some Dimensions of the 
Problem," Chapter I, in Chenery et al., op. cit., pp. 8·9. 
8. Iran, Iraq and Turkey are regarded as Middle Eastern countries and are, 
therefore, not listed here. 
8 
Number 
Percent 
Number 
Percent 
Number 
Percent 
Number 
Percent 
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Table 2. Number and Percent Distribution of 
Selected Countries in Terms of 
Income Distribution 
Total High Inequality Moderate Inequality Low Inequality 
(1) 26 Countries with per capita GNP up 
to US $300 a year 
26 10 8 8 
100.0 38.4 30.8 30.8 
(2) 21 Countries with per capita GNP of 
US $300-750 a year 
21 10 6 5 
100.0 47.6 28.6 23.8 
(3) 19 Countries with per capita GNP 
above US $750 
19 3 8 8 
100.0 15.8 42.1 42.1 
(4) All 66 Countries 
66 23 22 21 
100.0 34.8 33.3 31.8 
Source: Chenery et al., Redistribution with Growth (Oxford: Oxford Univer· 
sity Press, 1974), pp. 8·9. 
The fact that income distribution has become increasingly 
equitable over a lengthy period of rapid growth in GNP per capita 
has made the Republic of China on Taiwan one of the few 
developing countries whose growth is "distributionally biased" in 
favor of persons with low incomes. A comparison with three other 
Asian countries can be seen in the estimates of Chenery et al., 
given in Table 4. 
The Trend of Increasing Equality in Income 
Distribution by Household 
The cross-section comparison presented in Table 2 shows the 
Taiwan economy as one of low income inequality on the basis of 
1964 data. A closer examination can be made by looking at the 
same statistics in several benchmark years both before and after 
1964. These figures show a progressive decline of inequality 
during a 20-year span in terms of several alternative measures 
(Table 5). 
Several phenomena are most interesting from the point of 
view of economic policy, and politically most significant from the 
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Table 3. Patterns of Income Distribution in 
Selected Asian Countries 
Relative Shares of Income 
by Income Class 
Year GNP per Lowest 40% Middle 40% Top20% 
of Capita of All of All of All 
9 
Data (US$) Households Households Households 
High Inequality 
The Philippines 1971 239 11.6 34.6 53.8 
Malaysia 1970 330 11.6 32.4 56.0 
Moderate Inequality 
Burma 1958 82 16.5 38.7 44.8 
India 1964 99 16.0 32.0 52.0 
Low Inequality 
Sri Lanka 1969 95 17.0 37.0 46.0 
Pakistan 1964 100 17.5 37.5 45.0 
Thailand 1970 180 17.0 37.5 45.5 
ROK (South Korea) 1970 235 18.0 37.0 45.0 
ROC (Taiwan) 1964 241 20.4 39.5 40.1 
Japan 1963 950 20.7 39.3 40.0 
Source: Chenery et al., op. cit., pp. 8-9. 
According to Chenery et al., "The income shares of each percentile group were 
read off a free-hand Lorenz curve fitted to observed points in the cumulative 
distribution. The distributions are for pretax income. Per capita GNP figures are 
taken from the World Bank data files and refer to GNP at factor cost for the year 
indicated in constant 1971 U.S. dollars." 
For the benefit of American readers, the corresponding figures for the United 
States, also a country of low income inequality, are: 
1970 4,850 19.7 41.5 38.8 
perspectives both of the Republic of China and of other countries. 
One is the combination of a progressive movement toward greater 
equality by income class with a sharp increase in GNP and in 
average household income over the same period. At constant 1972 
prices, per capita GNP in Taiwan rose from NT$10,875 in 1964 to 
NT$19,122 in 1972, while average household income rose from 
NT$32,452 in 1964 to NT$61,032 in 1972.9 This means that the 
9. At constant 1972 prices the real household income of the lowest decile rose 
by 109.2'1[, from NT$9,854 in 1964 to NT$20,618 in 1972. In contrast, the 
improvement for the top decile was 52.5'l'n during the same period, from NT$84,454 
in 1964 to NT$128,760 in 1972. These data, not including the Taipei municipality 
10 
Korea 
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Table 4. Comparative Income Growth Rates 
Annual Rates of Income 
Growth in Percent by 
Class of Income 
Recipients 
Annual Increase in 
Welfare for the 
Country as a Whole 
Upper Middle Lowest GNP Equal Poverty 
Period 20% 40% 40% Weights Weights Weights 
1964·70 10.6 7.8 9.3 9.3 9.0 9.0 
The Philippines 1961·71 4.9 6.4 5.0 5.4 5.5 5.4 
India 1954-64 5.1 3.9 3.9 4.5 4.1 4.0 
Taiwan 1953-61 4.5 9.1 12.1 6.8 9.4 10.4 
Source: Chenery et al., op. cit., Chapter 2, p. 42. 
"Equal Weights" implies a weight of 0.2 for the upper 20% of the income 
recipients, and 0.4 and, again, 0.4 for the middle and lowest 40% respectively. 
"Poverty Weights" are 0.1 for the highest 20%, 0.3 for the middle 40%, and 0.6 for 
the lowest 40%. 
Although the "poverty weights" are clearly arbitrary and could just as well be 
replaced by other weights, the effect of their use in the case of Taiwan is especially 
illuminating. 
groups at the lower end of the income ladder enjoyed an 
accelerated rate of absolute and relative improvement, which is 
what some development economists have advocated as most 
desirable.10 The narrowing of the income gap between the rich and 
the poor in the course of economic growth through the faster 
improvement of those in lower income intervals is bound to affect 
mutual perceptions of one another by people of different incomes, 
making the establishment of consensus for major policies easier. 
Given the wide distribution of television sets in Taiwan and the 
great visual impact of differences in living standards and life 
styles due to income differences, this is an important stabilizing 
and unifying influence not to be lightly ignored. 
A second interesting phenomenon is the continuation of the 
trend toward greater equality over the entire 20 year period. The 
first decade of economic development was accompanied by a 
sharp decrease in income inequality: 18% between 1953 and 1961 
for 1972, would yield a ratio between the top and bottom deciles of 6.2. If Taipei is 
included, as in Table 2, the ratio becomes 6.8, reflecting the greater concentration 
of higher income households in the capital city. 
10. See Chenery et al., op. cit. 
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Table 5. Changes in Income Distribution in Taiwan 
Distribution in Quintiles 1953 1961 1964 1972 
Lowest quintile of all households 3.0 4.5 7.7 8.6 
Second quintile 8.3 9.7 12.6 13.1 
Middle quintile 9.1 14.0 16.6 17.0 
Fourth quintile 18.2 19.8 22.1 22.2 
Highest quintile 61.4 52.0 41.0 39.1 
Second highest 15% 28.8 26.4 24.8 24.8 
Top 5% 32.6 25.6 16.2 14.3 
Gini Coefficient 0.56 0.46 0.33 0.30 
Ratio of Income Share 
Top 10% to bottom 10% 30.4 19.3 8.6 6.8 
Top 20% to bottom 20% 20.5 11.6 5.3 4.6 
Index of Decile Inequality 0.46 0.37 0.26 0.24 
Source: Wan-yong Kuo, "Income Distribution by Size in Taiwan Area -
Changes and Causes" (Paper presented to the Joint JERC-CAME Seminar on 
Income Distribution, Employment and Economic Development in Southeast and 
East Asia, Tokyo, December 16-20, 1974), Table 5. The original 1953 figures are 
taken from Kowie Chang, "An Estimate of Taiwan's Personal Income Distribution 
in 1953 -Pareto's Formula Discussed and Applied" (in Chinese), Journal of Social 
Science, Taipei, Vol. 7 (August 1956): 260. The 1961 estimates are from Kowie 
Chang's report on a Pilot Study of Personal Income and Consumption in Taiwan 
(mimeographed in English), prepared under the auspices of a National Income 
Statistics Working Group of the Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting & 
Statistics (DGBAS), of the Executive Yuan, Table A, p. 23. The 1964 estimates are 
those of DGBAS as presented in its report on Survey of Family Income & 
Expenditure & Study of Personal Income Distribution in Taiwan (in Chinese). The 
1972 estimates are also based on DGBAS data, adjusted by Wan-yong Kuo with 
income tax receipts data and through the incorporation of data for the Taipei 
special municipality which is no longer included in the original provincial figures 
following the elevation of its administrative status in 1968. (Provincial Statistics in 
1968 still include Taipei.) The 1964 data in this table give us 20.3% for the lowest 
40%, 38. 7";, for the middle 40%, and 41% for the top 20%, which are very close to the 
estimates for Taiwan in Table 1. 
in terms of the Gini income concentration ratio.U This was 
followed by a further decrease in terms of the same index of 28.3% 
m 1961-64 and of another 9.1% in 1964-72. How did these 
11. The Gini index can vary from 0 (total absolute equality) to 1 (total 
inequality). The Gini index for family income in the United States was .37 
according to the 1960 census and .36 in the 1970 census. That of Japan was .35 
(1960). U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1960 and 1970 Census of Population, Part I, U.S. 
Summary, and Annual Report of the Family Income and Expenditure Survey, 
Japan, 1963. 
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progressive and continued improvements in distribution come 
about simultaneously with rapid increases in total output and 
several significant shifts of Taiwan's development strategy 
during the two decades? 
Income Differentials between Farmers and Non-Farmers 
and Sectoral Distribution Patterns 
If changes in income distribution in Taiwan have resulted in 
greater equality in terms of various measures based on income 
classes cutting across different economic sectors, what changes in 
income differences have occurred both between and in individual 
sectors? An answer to this question will go a part of the way in 
answering the question raised at the end of the last section. As 
mentioned in the Introduction, growing differences in this respect 
could also create antagonisms detrimental to economic and 
political stability and the national consensus in policy making. 
Let us attempt to answer this question with respect to farm 
and non-farm families 12 about which considerable statistical 
information is available. Using the DGBAS data for 1970-72 
adjusted to include the city of Taipei, Kuo Wan-yang shows that 
while income equality increased in the entire economy during 
1964-72, the degree of equality increased more- that is, the Gini 
coefficient decreased more- for non-farm families than for farm 
families (Table 6). In 1972, the Gini coefficient showed a greater 
degree of equality for the former than for the latter although their 
relative standings had been the reverse in 1964. The "cross-over" 
occurred between 1970 and 1971. Given these patterns of 
distribution within the two sectors, respectively, it is not 
surprising that the rapid expansion of the industrial sector in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s contributed to greater overall equality 
rather than inequality. 
Contrary to the preceding favorable distributive effect of rapid 
industrial growth, to be explained below, an unfavorable develop-
ment during 1964-72 was the widening discrepancy between farm 
and non-farm incomes although both were rising. Average income 
per farm family rose by 53.3% between 1964 and 1972, from 
NT$32,013 to NT$49,090, at constant 1972 prices. On the other 
hand, average non-farm family income rose by 97%, from 
NT$32,740, virtually at par with farm family income, in 1964 to 
12. The classification is based on the occupation of the family head. Family 
income from all sources is included. Thus, the income of a farm family may include 
income from both agricultural and non-agricultural pursuits of all family members. 
The same is true of the income of a non-farm family. 
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Table 6. Gini Coefficients of Income Concentration by Sector 
Year Farm Non-farm Both Sectors 
1964 0.315 0.336 o.:i28 
1968 0.292 0.338 o.aas 
1970 0.283 0.285 0.299 
1971 0.297 0.292 0.301 
1972 0.291 0.288 0.295 
Source: Kuo Wan-yong, "Income Distribution by Size in Taiwan Area -
Changes and Causes" (1974). (Papers and Proceedings of the Seminar sponsored 
by the Japan Economic Research Center and The Council for Asian Manpower 
Studies, December 16-20, Vol. II, July 1975), Table 7. 
NT$64,497 in 1972, 31.5% higher than the corresponding farm 
figureP This factor is probably among the most serious potential 
threats to income equality if it is allowed to continue unchecked. 
Economic Policy and Income Equality 
The changes in overall and sectoral income distribution in 
Taiwan can be explained in terms of (1) sectoral emphasis and 
shifts in development strategy over time, (2) the open economy 
and foreign trade orientation of the island, (3) the initial state of 
asset distribution and subsequent changes effected by government 
intervention, and (4) other governmental measures that have 
improved access to education and technology and redirected 
investment in favor of certain groups and sectors that might 
otherwise have been at a disadvantage in comparison with the 
rest of the society. 
The 1950s and Early 1960s 
Two basic facts should be home in mind. First, since the ratio 
of labor to capital in agricultural production, given Taiwan's 
small-farm, labor-intensive economy, was a priori greater in 
13. Kuo, op. cit., 1974, Table 13. This increasing sectoral discrepancy also 
accounted for the fact that the overall Gini index in 1970-72 (Table 4) is higher 
than both sectoral coefficients. See Kuo, op. cit., for a technical discussion of what 
she calls the "within," "between," and "share" effects. 
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agriculture than in the non-agricultural sector during the 1950s, a 
larger share of factor income should go to labor in the agricultural 
sector than in the non-agricultural sector as production in both 
sectors increased. (The reverse may be true in the case of the 
labor-land ratio other than urban housing construction.) How the 
relative shares of labor to capital (or labor to land) in factor 
income might change in the aggregate would depend upon the 
relative rates of growth of the two economic sectors during a given 
period. Second, as shown in Table 7 the contribution of agriculture 
to net domestic product per capita grew at about the same rate 
during 1952-60 as did the non-agricultural sector. Thus, if other 
things had been equal, the expansion of agricultural and non-
agricultural production at a virtually equal pace during 1952-60 
should not alter the proportion between factor income earned by 
labor and factor income that went to owners of property, i.e., both 
land and capital. The benefit of increased production would then 
be shared by labor and property owners in the same proportion as 
their respective income shares were at the beginning of the period. 
Table 7. Contribution of Agriculture to Net 
Domestic Product per Capita 
1952 1960 
Total population (in thousand persons) 8,128 10,792 
Agriculture 4,257 5,373 
Non-agriculture 3,871 5,419 
Net Domestic Product (NT$ million) 
Agriculture 5,233 16,528 
Non-agriculture 9,424 34,305 
Per Capita Value-added (NT$) 
Agriculture 1,229.3 3,076.1 
Non-agriculture 2,434.5 6,330.5 
Ratio of Non-agriculture: 
Agriculture 1.98:1 2.06:1 
1972 
15,289 
5,947 
9,342 
38,121 
190,217 
6,410.1 
20,361.5 
3.18:1 
Source: Taiwan Data Book (Taipei: Economic Planning Council, 1974), pp. 4, 
27, 49. 
However, other things did not remain equal during this 
period. One of the most important economic events in the early 
1950s, if not the most important single event, was the implementa-
tion of land reform in Taiwan in 1953 (one of the benchmark years 
previously selected), preceded during 1949-52 by sale of public land 
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and reduction of land rent paid by tenant farmers. The rent 
reduction had the effect of reducing the rate of return to property 
in the agricultural sector, thereby increasing the relative share of 
labor in a period of rising agricultural output and income (Table 
8). 
Table 8. Distribution of Agriculture Income 
by Factor (in percent) 
Land Capital Labor 
Before Land Reform 
(Under Japanese Rule) 
1941 52.20 11.48 36.32 
1942 51.99 11.44 36.57 
1943 45.65 10.04 44.31 
Post Land Reform 
1953 37.39 8.23 54.38 
1956 36.28 7.98 55.74 
Source: S. C. Hsieh and T. H. Lee, "Nung·yeh Fa·chan ti Tsung·ho Lun·shu" 
<A Comprehensive Study of Agricultural Development). JCRR Special Report No. 
2R, July 1959 reprinted in T. H. Yu, ed., Taiwan Nung·yeh Fa·chan Lun·wen·chi 
(Essays on Taiwan's Agricultural Development) (Taipei: Lien·ching Publications 
Co., 1975), p. 37, Table 13. 
Under Land Reform, the conversion of many tenants into 
owner farmers and wider dispersion of land ownership, with 
limitation on the size of individual holdings, had the effect of 
further spreading property income among a larger number of farm 
families. The net effect of rent reduction and land reform together, 
therefore, was to increase sharply the degree of equality in income 
distribution in the agricultural sector. 
It goes without saying that these beneficial effects of asset 
redistribution through land reform could have been at least 
partially nullified had agricultural production declined. The 
actual increase in production after land reform enabled the 
recipients of property income in the agricultural sector also to 
enjoy rising income from property ownership. One must therefore 
also examine why agricultural output actually increased after 
land reform, a point to be discussed elsewhere. 
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The overall equalizing effect of greater income equality in the 
agricultural sector during 1952-60 was not offset by developments 
in the non-agricultural sector where income distribution was more 
unequal. Several factors contributed to this outcome. First, the 
discrepancy between agricultural and non-agricultural per capita 
income which developed later did not widen significantly during 
this period. Second, the expansion of production in the non-
agricultural sector during this period was probably brought about 
by an increase mostly in relatively small businesses, many of 
which were established by new immigrant entrepreneurs from the 
China mainland. Even in the beginning of the 1970s small firms 
employing less than 100 persons each were still responsible for 
35% of gross production in manufacturing.14 Private capital 
ownership was not highly concentrated. A number of large 
industrial enterprises previously owned by the Japanese had been 
taken over by the ROC government and were run as public 
enterprises so that income which would have accrued to property 
owners of these enterprises went to the Treasury. Third, outside 
the economic infrastructure which was expanded by the govern-
ment and government enterprises, industrial production in 
Taiwan during this early phase of the island's postwar economic 
development stressed consumer goods production using products 
from the agricultural sector as inputs. Thus expansion in the non-
agricultural sector had the effect of stimulating production in the 
agricultural sector where income distribution was more equal. At 
the same time, production in the industrial sector was not capital 
intensive; the initial asset distribution did not seem to be highly 
14. See Gustav Ranis' essay on Taiwan in Chenery et al., op. cit., 1974. 
According to the criteria employed by the ROC government, any firm that is 
engaged in manufacturing, processing or handicraft production is officially 
designated as a small or medium-sized enterprise (a) if its registered capital and 
total assets are below NT$5 million and NT$20 million respectively, or (b) if its 
registered capital is below NT$5 million and its employment is below 100-300 
persons, the exact cut off being dependent upon the nature of the industry. For 
firms engaged in trade, service and transportation the maxima are 50 persons in 
employment and NT$5 million in annual sales. Of all these firms, those employing 
fewer than one hundred persons are generally regarded as "small businesses." 
According to the 1971 Industrial and Commercial Consensus, the small firms 
numbered 276,095 or 98.97% of all the reporting firms. Within the manufacturing 
sector, they numbered 40,737 or 95.43% of the total. These small manufacturers 
were responsible for 35% of gross production, 35.6% of employment, 34% of value-
added, and 45% of export sales, as compared with the entire manufacturing sector. 
See C. C. Chao, "Small Business Development" (paper prepared for the US-ROC 
Symposium for Small Business Development and Trade Promotion, San Francisco, 
March 25-26, 1976). 
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concentrated; the small-scale enterprises tended to spread the 
benefit of increased production more widely among owners of 
industrial property. Also, the most important industrial inputs 
used by the agricultural sector at that time, viz., chemical 
fertilizers and pesticides, were mostly imported. Their purchase 
did not constitute a source of demand for the domestic industrial 
sector. Finally, greater industrial employment and the relative 
ease of business formation by enterprising persons of low income 
were obviously helpful in raising the earnings of the lower-income 
groups in the non-agricultural sector. 
To sum up, (1) the ROC government's initial emphasis on 
agricultural production, (2) asset redistribution through land 
reform, (3) the consumer goods and small business emphasis in 
the industrial sector, and (4) certain characteristics of asset 
distribution of the postwar and post-1949 period were responsible 
for the improvement in income distribution in Taiwan during the 
1950s and the beginning of the 1960s. 
From the 1960s to the early 1970s 
Although further improvement in income equality slowed 
down during the 1960s and early 1970s, a remarkable phenom-
enon was that the movement toward greater equality continued in 
both the farm and non-farm sectors. This occurred in spite of a 
widening gap between farm and non-farm family incomes due to 
the failure of agricultural production to keep pace with the 
accelerated expansion of industrial production. Several factors are 
involved in explaining what happened to income distribution in 
the second decade. 
First, the crux of the development strategy adopted during 
this period was the expansion of foreign trade. In the light of the 
preceding expansion of the agricultural sector, export expansion 
began very naturally with increased export of agricultural and 
processed agricultural products. This was helpful in sustaining 
agricultural income. 
Second, because of the paucity of its natural resources, 
Taiwan's foreign trade orientation involved an expansion of both 
exports and imports. By eschewing self-sufficiency as an objec-
tive, the rapidly expanding exports were based on progressively 
increasing imports which included many capital-intensive prod-
ucts. Any attempt to achieve self-sufficiency by stressing import 
substitution at this point would doubtless have reduced the rate of 
expansion considerably. The export orientation of Taiwan's 
economic development not only increased the rate of economic 
18 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES 
growth, but also reduced the rate at which capital's share of factor 
income was to increase. 
Third, much of the export expansion during this period took 
place in the form of labor-intensive products. Imported raw 
materials and intermediate goods were processed into finished 
goods for export through the concentrated application of labor 
which was much cheaper in Taiwan than in the countries where 
Taiwan exports were marketed. The several Export Processing 
Zones established to attract foreign capital were especially 
illustrative of this practice. The effect on income distribution was 
twofold. Within the industrial sector, the very rapid expansion of 
labor-intensive exports in the late 1960s and early 1970s, prior to 
the 1974 world-wide recession induced by the oil cartel's price hike, 
reduced the initial labor surplus and raised wages and employ-
ment. The result was to raise the earnings of non-farm families at 
the lower income levels. For farm families, participation in the 
rapid expansion of the industrial sector took place partly through 
access to the new employment opportunities offered. Many women 
employees of foreign businesses in the Export Processing Zones 
came from farm families. The net effect was to increase the 
proportion of non-agricultural income for farm families, especially 
those with smaller land holdings. This in turn served to reduce the 
income discrepancy between farm and non-farm families, in spite 
of the lagging growth of the farm versus the non-farm sector, 
while simultaneously increasing income equality in the farm 
sector.15 
15. See Chang Han·yu, "Taiwan Nung-chia So-te ti Pien-hua yii Shih-p'ing 
Chia-kung chih Fa-chan," (Changes in Taiwan's Agricultural Income and 
Development of the Food Processing Industry), Taiwan Ying-hang Chi-k'an 
(Quarterly Journal of the Bank of Taiwan), Vol. 24, No. 4 (December 1973). Chang 
gives the following data for 1965 and 1971: 
Non-agricultural Income as Percent of Agricultural Income 
1965 1971 
Farm family with cultivated 
land under 1/2 ha. 35.3 53.3 
Farm family with cultivated 
land exceeding 2 ha. 11.8 22.2 
Average of all farm families 19.4 28.2 
In 1971, for farm families or under .5 hectare, 34.6% of the non-agricultural 
income received came from wages, the rest being property income and income from 
other occupations, which presumably included both wage and property income. For 
families having more than 2 hectares, the proportion of wages in non-agricultural 
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In short, a very rapidly expanding industrial sector oriented 
to export that was based on processing of imported materials by 
highly labor-intensive methods was instrumental in raising 
wages, which also benefited farm families. The latter were 
progressively becoming less dependent on agriculture as their sole 
source of labor income. Under these conditions income equality 
was able to improve further, albeit at a slower rate than before. 
Distribution of Wealth between Pre- and Post-1945 Settlers 
Aside from the distribution of income between farm and non-
farm families, a related distributive factor of major interest is the 
relative economic status of the pre-1945 ethnic Chinese settlers of 
Taiwan (often loosely referred to as Taiwanese by Westerners) 
versus that of the post-1945 settlers (often referred to as 
Mainlanders). Since the "Mainlanders" came to Taiwan in 1945 to 
take over the Japanese administration, political power was 
initially vested entirely in their hands. During the past 30 years, 
they have progressively broadened the participation of govern-
ment so that more and more members of the pre-1945 settler group 
are now included in the government hierarchy. This progressively 
more equal distribution of political power, more advanced at the 
provincial and local government levels than at the central 
government level, should be considered in conjunction with the 
distribution of economic benefits between the two groups. An 
interesting point that concerns us in this paper is whether the 
relative economic status of the two groups corresponds to their 
relative political positions or whether a different relationship 
prevails. 
Although income distribution data are not available on the 
basis of the dates of immigration of family heads to Taiwan, the 
problem can be approached indirectly by examining the distribu-
tion of wealth between the two groups. Two major points need to 
be borne in mind in this connection. First, the 1953 land reform 
which took place not very long after the transfer of the central 
government of the Republic of China from the mainland to 
Taiwan effectively precluded the existence of absentee landlords. 
The earliest group of post-1945 settlers from the mainland 
consisted primarily of government officials, members of the armed 
forces, officers of public corporations and some businessmen. Few 
of them, if any, had either the inclination or time, before the land 
reform, to become farm land owners. Thus, land, a form of 
income was 1l.l'J'o. The corresponding proportions of wages in non-agricultural 
income in 1965 were 26.1% and 15.1 %, respectively. 
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physical asset of dominant importance during the early years of 
Taiwan's post-World War II economic development, has remained 
entirely in the hands of the pre-1945 settlers. Some of the public 
land taken over by the ROC government from the Japanese was 
also sold to the farmers as a part of the land reform program. 
While the government and public corporations, such as Taiwan 
Sugar, still own some of the land, there has not been any 
redistribution benefiting the post-1945 settlers. Only to the extent 
that land has been transferred from crop cultivation to non-
agricultural or other agricultural uses could ownership of landed 
wealth outside the urban areas become vested in the hands of 
post-1945 settlers. 
In view of the above, unless the distribution of wealth outside 
the agricultural sector were in favor of the post-1945 settlers, the 
distribution of wealth as a whole would tend to favor the pre-1945 
settlers who are owners of virtually all private farm land. A most 
important factor to bear in mind in this connection, therefore, is 
the distribution of ownership of large enterprises in the civilian 
sector of the economy. In 1975 there were 35 businesses in Taiwan 
whose annual sales exceeded NT$1 billion each. In addition, 
another 66 firms had annual sales exceeding NT$400 million each 
(see Table 9). Altogether 132 firms had annual sales exceeding 
NT$200 million each. If these firms are grouped according to 
whether the Chairman of the Board of Directors and the President 
of the firm 16 are from pre- or post-1945 settler families, 59% of the 
aggregate capital of all the firms is accounted for by enterprises 
headed by pre-1945 settlers as against 41% by post-1945 settlers. 
Furthermore, if a line is drawn at the level of NT$300 million in 
capitalization, there are 47 firms above this line. Of these larger 
firms, which are further divided into five intervals (see Table 10), 
those headed by pre-1945 settlers account for an overwhelmingly 
larger proportion of invested capital than the post-1945 settlers in 
four groups, the single exception being the group of firms with 
capitalization from NT$500 million to NT$1 billion. In contrast, 
for firms capitalized below NT$300 million, a larger proportion of 
invested capital is accounted for by enterprises with post-1945 
settler heads, the only exception being the group of firms with 
capitalization of NT$100 to NT$200 million. 
Similarly, one can use annual sales as the criterion. On this 
basis, of 10 firms each with annual sales in excess of NT$3 billion, 
7 are headed by pre-1945 settlers and only 3 by post-1945 settlers. 
16. A few firms had non-Chinese Presidents or Board Chairmen. 
Table 9. Business Enterprises in Taiwan 
with Annual Sales Exceeding NT $200 Million 
-Aggregate Annual Sales (NT $ million) z Ci 
0 
Heads No. fi,OOOto 4,000to 3,000to 2,000to 1,000to fiOOto rs: 
of of Over under under under under under under Under t!J 
l"irms Firms 6,000 6,000 5,000 4,000 3,000 2,000 1,000 500 Total t:l 
..... 
r:n 
..., 
PrP·194G 69 6,147.5 10,947.3 9,162.7 6,163.0 4,559.2 12,692.H 22,20:3.7 6,162.1 7H,O:lH.:l ::e ..... 
Settlers (1) (2) (2) (2) (2) (10) Ul2) (1H) (69) ttl c:: 
Post-1945 6:l 9,859.5 (0) 4,080.1 3,225.4 7,477.7 13,970.fi 10,4RO.O 11,99fi.H 61,01-\9.0 ..., 
..... 
Settlers (1) (10) (1) (1) (3) (10) (14) (:l:l) (6:{) 0 
Total l:l2 16,007.0 10,947.3 13,242.8 9,3R8.4 12,036.9 26,66:!.:{ :l2,6H:l.7 18,157.9 I :lH,l27.:l z 
Percent -z 
-----
Pre-194G 52 38 100 69 66 3H 4R 6H :l4 [i() "":3 
Settlers :I: t!J 
Post-194fJ 48 62 0 31 :l4 62 52 :l2 6(; 14 ~ Settlers 0 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 )()() 0 
Figures in parentheses are the numbers of firms in each group. 
Source: Ching-chi Jih-pao (Economic Daily News) (Taipei), April, 1976. 
1:-.:l 
1-' 
!:>:) 
!:>:) 
Table 10. Business Enterprises in Taiwan 
with Annual Sales Exceeding NT $200 Million 
Total Capitalization (1,000,000 NT $) 0 0 
Heads No. 1,000to 500to 400to 300to 200to lOOto 
z 
...;! 
of of Over under under under under under under Under trJ ~ 
Firms Firms 2,000 2,000 1,000 500 400 300 200 100 Total '"C 
0 
Pre-1945 69 2,040.0 5,379.3 5,077.0 4,493.7 2,425.3 2,717.0 2,581.5 429.3 25,143.1 ~ ~ 
Settlers (1) (4) (8) (10) (7) (12) (19) (8) (69) >< 
Post-1945 61* - 2,120.0 7,430.9 810.0 680.0 3,521.8 1,907.6 667.8 17,138.1 > 
Settlers (0) (2) (11) (2) (2) (15) (14) (15) (61) r:n .... 
Total HlO 2,040.0 7,499.3 12,507.9 5,303.7 3,105.3 6,238.8 4,489.1 1,097.1 42,281.2 )-z 
Percent r:n 
Pre-1945 53 100 72 41 85 78 44 58 39 59 ...;! c: 
Settlers t:j 
Post-1945 47 0 28 59 15 22 56 42 61 41 
.... 
trJ 
Settlers r:n 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 en trJ 
~ 
t;j 
*Two of the firms are without data on capital r:n 
Figures in parentheses are the numbers of firms in each group. 
Source: Ching-chi Jih-pao (Economic Daily News) (Taipei), April, 1976. 
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In contrast, of 122 firms each with annual sales below NT$3 
billion, 62 are headed by pre-1945 settlers as against 60 by post-
1945 settlers. Furthermore, within each sales interval above the 
NT$3 billion mark, firms headed by pre-1945 settlers account for 
an overwhelmingly larger proportion of total sales, there being 
only a single exception. In all the sales intervals below the NT$3 
billion mark the reverse is true, again with the exception of a 
single interval. 
An earlier survey in 196917 which divided business firms in 
Taiwan on the basis of financial groups shows that of 337 firms 
which can be clearly identified in terms of ownership by pre- or 
post-1945 settlers, 60% were accounted for by the pre-1945 settlers 
while the post-1945 settlers controlled 28% (95 firms), with 12% (41 
firms) representing combined ownership. Furthermore, the firms 
of the pre-1945 group were responsible for 61 o/o of invested capital 
on the basis of capitalization and 59% of business revenue in that 
year. On the other hand, the firms of the post-1945 group were 
responsible for 30% of invested capital and 31 o/o of total business 
revenue. The mixed group accounted for 9% of capitalization and 
11 o/o of revenue. These earlier statistics point to the larger 
ownership of the pre-1945 settlers in business outside the 
agricultural sector, but there was no noticeable disparity in size 
between the enterprises of the two groups. Hence the growth of the 
relative importance of the pre-1945 settlers in the control of the 
larger enterprises in the 1975 survey appeared to be a phenom-
enon of the early 1970s. 
Both the 1969 and 1975 statistics lend support to the 
conclusion that the larger Taiwan enterprises are headed by pre-
1945 settlers while the smaller firms have a larger proportion of 
post-1945 settler heads. The more recent growth was in favor of 
the pre-1945 settlers for the larger enterprises and the post-1945 
settlers for the smaller ones. The exceptions to the rule are 
relatively few. Although the 1975 data deal with only the larger 
firms, while the 1969 data include a wider spectrum of businesses, 
comparison of the more recent findings with the 1969 statistics 
suggest that there may have been a trend during the first half of 
the 1970s for the post-1945 settlers to move up in their relative 
economic standing while some members of the pre-1945 settler 
group forged even further ahead. In view of the fact that the post-
1945 settlers were late comers and few of them had settled in 
17. See Chang Chiin-Hung, Taiwan She·hui-li ti fen-hsi (An analysis of Social 
forces in Taiwan) (Taipei: Huan-Yii Publishing Co., 1972), pp. 32-42. 
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Taiwan with vast personal wealth, it is quite understandable that 
they have had to compete very hard in the private economic sector 
and are not in a dominant position. This can be contrasted with 
the more favorable political position the post-1945 settlers enjoyed. 
We have already noted the movement toward greater equality in 
the distribution of political power in favor of the pre-1945 settlers. 
The present statistical analysis indicates that there may have 
been a slight and slower shift toward greater equality in the 
distribution of industrial and commercial wealth in favor of the 
post-1945 settlers. Fortunately for Taiwan, therefore, the redistri-
bution of political power and material wealth can move in 
opposite directions, thus serving to compensate each other. A 
priori, one is inclined to conclude that this is a situation favoring 
greater social stability. 
Future Prospects 
We have put the preceding discussion on income distribution 
in the past tense although many of the conditions of the 1960s and 
early 1970s continue to hold today, because several circumstances 
now exist that could significantly alter the course of development. 
First, Taiwan is trying to shift toward more capital-intensive and 
technology-intensive production. It is also trying to supply 
domestically more of the manufactured industrial raw materials it 
needs. The relative rates of growth of the agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors will change further and the relative share of 
capital as factor income will probably also rise. There is a latent 
tendency, therefore, toward less rather than greater equality in 
income distribution unless capital ownership can become progres-
sively more equally distributed, and unless other corrective 
measures are undertaken. Thus the role of government interven-
tion may have to, and probably will, increase in order to forestall 
a reversal of the previous trend toward greater equality in income 
distribution. Both existing and new measures, fiscal and other-
wise, will have to be expanded, but greater government interven-
tion could stifle productivity and economic growth if adequate 
safeguards and judicious restraint are not provided. 
Within this context some of the measures adopted in recent 
years deserve mention. In the first place, the progressive income 
tax, although a part of the ROC's long-standing taxes, has been 
implemented much more vigorously in recent years as a result of 
technical reforms in data collection and reporting. Income tax 
collections increased noticeably between 1966 and 1972, especially 
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for the higher income bracketsY· Secondly, among the more recent 
measures, reduction of various hidden taxes levied in the form of 
rice collection since 1964, and particularly since 1969, has 
contributed to greater income equality, especially in reducing the 
disparity between farm and non-farm incomes. These two 
categories of measures are clearly focused on income transfers. 
In the third place, expansion of the stock exchange, which can 
be seen in an increase in the number of listed stocks between 1962 
and 1973, has been a welcome development in promoting the 
dispersion of property ownership. 19 This development could be 
extended if institutions can be developed in the near future so that 
farm families can progressively participate in industrial expan-
sion by becoming owners of stocks in industrial enterprises just as 
they have ah·eady participated by providing labor to the 
expanding industrial sector. It may be necessary for the 
government to step in by organizing intermediaries in the form of 
"mutual funds" which can collect rural savings for investment in 
industry, thus altering the distribution of industrial assets which 
are growing rapidly. 
Another set of government measures has had the effect of 
especially accelerating development in the lagging agricultural 
sector. Special funds over and above the level of private 
investment have been earmarked in recent years for investment in 
the accelerated development of agriculture. Central government 
funds totalling NT$2.43 billion have been provided for this 
purpose in the 1977 fiscal year. As of 1975 year-end, projects 
totalling NT$2.58 billion (including central government and other 
funds) in expenditure had been approved out of the 1976 fiscal 
year program.20 A portion of the expenditures is channeled 
through programs for irrigation, flood control, etc. under the 
jurisdiction of the provincial authorities. The bulk of these 
expenditures is aimed at expanding the infrastructure of the 
agricultural sector. Efforts such as this are aimed at modifying 
sectoral balance and income disparity between sectors. There may 
be some question about the rate of return obtained from such 
special efforts. The issue clearly is one of balancing growth 
against distribution and touches upon the central question that 
18. See Kuo, up. cit., 1974. The income tax, however, does not seem to have 
significantly altered the differential between farm and non-farm incomes. 
19. The number of listed stocks increased over 14 times between 1962 and 
1973. The increase in their market value was over 43 times. See Kuo, op. cit. 
20. See ;eports in the Central Daily News (Taipei), January 4 and 7, 1976. 
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economic development, not to mention the overall development of 
a society, may have multiple goals. 
Finally, there are two important sets of measures that have 
begun to be implemented in 1976. One is the ruling that the heads 
of government-related banking institutions must henceforth be 
rotated so as to avoid the emergence of financial fiefs. The second 
development is the progressive implementation of the law limiting 
urban land ownership and taxation of large capital gains derived 
from such ownership. This is both to avoid overconcentration of 
ownership of urban property and to discourage land speculation 
and wealth accumulation based on large "unearned" increments. 
Thus the authorities are evidently coming to grips with emergent 
issues affecting distribution. 
The Anti-Poverty Program (Hsiao-k'ang Chi-hua) 
In considering income distribution we must obviously exam-
ine not only the relative shares of successive segments of the 
population on the income ladder, but also especially the absolute 
income levels of the lowest income groups. Another effort aimed at 
a particular segment of the population is Taiwan's anti-poverty 
program. This effort to reduce the number of persons in absolute 
poverty and to elevate the income level of persons at the bottom of 
the income ladder deserves closer attention. The issue was 
officially recognized by the provincial government of Taiwan in 
October 1972 as a major plank in its program.21 Already in 1967 a 
set of unified standards was adopted by the Taiwan provincial 
government in defining and registering "poverty households." 
According to these standards the poorest or "Step 1 poverty 
households" consist of those households whose members are 
"unable to work" and are devoid of all assets or income.22 They 
are therefore completely dependent upon relief and government 
21. For reference see Tai·wan·sheng T'ui-hsing Hsiao k'ang·chi-hua Kung-tso· 
shou·ts'e [Anti-poverty Program Manual, edited and published by the Taiwan 
Provincial Government, May 1973] and Tai-wan-sheng Cheng-fu She-hui-ch'u 
King-tso-pao-kao [Work Report of the Office of Social Affairs, Taiwan Provincial 
Government before the Seventh Session of the Fifth Taiwan Provincial Assembly, 
March 31, 1976]. 
22. The following twelve categories of persons are defined as "without ability 
to work": 
1. Persons under 16 years of age. 
2. Persons in school under 18. 
3. Persons under 18 who have no earnings from work and who have 
only widowed mothers or grandparents. 
4. Parents in active military service. 
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aid. The medium or "Step 2 poverty households" are those whose 
total income is not more than one-half of the stipulated 
expenditure at "subsistence level" and not more than one-quarter 
of whose members can work. The minimum or "Step 3 poverty 
households" are those whose total income is not more than two-
thirds of the subsistence level and not more than one-third of 
whose members can work. "Subsistence level" is defined as 
NT$200 per capita per month or NT$2,400 a year. The "poverty 
line," at two-thirds of NT$2,400, is therefore set at NT$1,600 per 
person per year. For a family of five persons a total annual 
income of NT$8,000 (approximately US$200) would put it on the 
poverty line. 2a 
As of 1967 there were 110,036 poverty households in Taiwan, 
outside Taipei. In addition, there were 8,929 poverty households in 
the municipality of Taipei. In combination there were 118,965 
poverty households in all Taiwan. This total amounted to 5.11% of 
total households in Taiwan in that year, 5.28% for Taiwan 
province and 3.31% for Taipei. Between 1967 and 1971, as a result 
of growing economic prosperity, the number of poverty households 
declined steadily, averaging 8.9% a year for all Taiwan. A sharp 
decrease was further registered immediately after the inaugura-
tion of the anti-poverty program in 1972, and the decline of 
poverty households has continued since. 
5. Persons serving prison or probationary sentence whose unexpired 
term exceeds six months in duration. 
6. Persons who are disabled or mentally ill and who have no 
earnings from work. 
7. Men over 60 and women over 55 without earnings from work. 
8. Persons registered as missing for more than six months. 
9. Persons who have been seriously ill for more than three months 
and cannot work and are without regular income. 
10. Widowed single parents who have to care for one or more children 
under 6 years of age and are without regular earnings. 
11. Orphaned children under 12 years of age who are cared for by 
grandparents and are without regular income. 
12. Women without regular earnings who are six months pregnant 
and have to support their own children under three years of age. 
The above stipulations are those of the Taiwan Provincial Government. 
Similar regulations with minor variations exist in the Taipei Municipality. 
2:3. The Taipei Municipality poverty standard, as revised in November 1973, 
divides poverty households into two categories only. Step 1 poverty households are 
defined identically as the first step poverty households under the Provincial 
Government regulations. The Step 2 poverty households are defined in the same 
way as the minimum poverty households under the Provincial Government 
regulations. However, the minimum subsistence level is fixed at NT$300 a month 
instead of NT$200. 
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Statistical data on the anti-poverty program are more readily 
available for "Taiwan province" outside the Taipei municipality. 
As can be seen from Table 11, the number of poverty households 
fell from 74.2 thousand in 1971 to 25.7 thousand in 1975. The total 
number of persons in such households declined from 391 thousand 
to 104 thousand during the same period. While statistics 
concerning Taipei are less current, there was also a decline from 
8.4 thousand poverty households in 1971 to 7.0 thousand in 1973. 
As of 1973, only 1.59% of all households in Taiwan outside Taipei 
and 1.64% in Taipei were still classified as poverty households. 
Table 11. Number of "Poverty Households" and Persons 
Poorest Medium Poverty Minimum Poverty Total 
House- House- House- House-
holds Persons holds Persons holds Persons holds Persons 
1971 16,992 27,196 18,887 110,822 38,368 253,445 74,247 391,463 
1972 17,536 28,634 17,182 100,274 33,250 218,001 67,968 346,909 
1973 14,461 23,744 11,006 58,062 17,675 114,556 43,142 196,362 
1974 11,587 18,882 9,065 48,191 11,254 70,907 31,906 137,980 
1975 25,726 103.952 
Source: Department of Social Affairs, Taiwan Provincial Government. 
It should be borne in mind that poverty households are 
defined on the basis of per capita income. A poverty household of 
many persons can therefore have a larger family income than a 
non-poverty household smaller in size. Therefore, one cannot 
assume that households below a certain income level in statistics 
of income distribution by household would automatically consist 
of poverty households. However, most of such households are 
probably below the poverty line. Thus the decline in poverty 
households and the reduction of the number of households in 
lower income levels on the income distribution ladder discussed 
earlier go hand in hand. 
With the rise of retail prices, the required expenditures at the 
stipulated subsistence level have also increased. However, a study 
conducted in 1971 showed that even if the subsistence level 
expenditure had been fixed at 50% higher, or NT$300 per person 
per month outside the Taipei municipality, the number of poverty 
households under the jurisdiction of the Taiwan provincial 
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authorities would only be raised by 7.8%. This is considerably 
below the 36BJ\J decrease in poverty households registered in 1973 
as compared with 1972 when the anti-poverty program was 
officially inaugurated. Thus the decline in poverty households 
r.luring the first half of the 1970s is quite real and should be 
attributed largely to both economic expansion and efforts under 
the anti-poverty program.~4 In the post-1973 oil crisis period, price 
inflation has further increased expenditures at subsistence level. 
However, by defining household income, which is compared with 
the fixed subsistence level expenditure in determining the poverty 
line, at "standard" wage levels by occupation substantially below 
the actual wages received, some, if not all, of the effect of inflation 
has been offset. 
The anti-poverty program includes nine major activities: (1) 
expansion of relief and institution care, (2) aid to production 
through small business loans and construction of marketing 
facilities, (3) active job placement, (4) expansion of occupational 
training in cooperation with factories and vocational schools, (5) 
construction of low-cost housing in order to improve environmen-
tal hygiene, (6) promotion of family planning including free 
family visits and advice, (7) promotion of school attendance by 
school age children, as well as vocational and adult education, 
from poverty households through such measures as tuition loans, 
(8) promotion of community production and welfare activities in 
order to expand the base of the anti-poverty program beyond the 
level of government effort alone, and (9) integration of the 
program as a social movement with education, mass communica-
tion, and the establishment and expansion of special relief funds. 
The basic approach of the program is threefold: (1) increasing 
employment and employability, (2) broadening the movement by 
enlisting the resources of the society as a whole, which helps 
reduce the fiscal and manpower burden on the government, and 
(:3) increasing both emergency aid, which helps minimize the 
emergence of new poverty households, and long-term aid to those 
who really cannot help themselves. 
Table 12 shows that the size of the poverty households varies 
considerably with the degree of poverty. The poorest, or Step 1 
poverty household, averages only 1.6 persons per household while 
the average number in the medium poverty household varies from 
5.9 persons in 1971 to 5.3 persons in 1974, showing a steady 
decline during the period. For the minimum poverty household, 
24. Lu Kuang. Tai-wan Ti·ch'u To-P'ing-chung Wen-ti (The Poverty Problem 
in Taiwan), She-hui Chien-she Social Reconstruction (Taipei, 1975) pp. 1-24. 
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the average number of persons per household varied from 6.6 in 
1971 to 6.3 in 1974. These figures suggest that the medium and 
minimum poverty households are poor partly because of the large 
size of the family. However, since the large family probably 
contains persons who could become employed, it may also stand a 
better chance of escaping poverty if employment can be found. On 
the other hand, the small size of the very poor families indicates 
that for them poverty is probably a chronic condition due to old 
age, physical disability or, at the other end of the income ladder, 
lack of adult care. (See the discussion on single person households 
at the end of this chapter.) 
Table 12. Number of Persons per "Poverty Household" 
All 
Medium Minimum Poverty 
Poorest Poverty Poverty Households 
1971 1.6 5.9 6.6 5.3 
1972 1.6 5.8 6.6 5.1 
1973 1.6 5.2 6.5 4.6 
1974 1.6 5.3 6.3 4.3 
Source: Department of Social Affairs, Taiwan Provincial Government. 
Table 13. Percent Distribution of Poverty Households 
by Degree of Poverty 
Medium Minimum 
Poorest Poverty Poverty Total 
1971 22.9 25.4 51.7 100.0 
1972 25.8 25.3 48.9 100.0 
1973 33.5 25.5 41.0 100.0 
1974 36.3 28.4 35.3 100.0 
Source: Department of Social Affairs, Taiwan Provincial Government. 
An examination of the distribution of poverty households by 
degree of poverty as shown in Table 13 indicates that the above 
interpretation is essentially correct. In 1971, nearly 52% of the 
INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN THE ROC 31 
poverty households were in the minimum poverty category while 
the medium poverty and poorest households accounted for 25% 
and 23'7.J, respectively. By 1974 the poorest households were 
responsible for 36% of a much smaller total of poverty households 
while the medium poverty group accounted for 28% and the 
minimum poverty group 35% of the total, respectively. The larger 
relative share of the poorest group indicates the existence of a 
hard-core poverty category requiring long-term aid. The largest 
reduction of the relative share of the minimum poverty group is, 
on the other hand, indicative of the increased employment of its 
members to which the anti-poverty program has contributed. 
One major thrust of the anti-poverty program is to encourage 
poverty households to declare themselves as "self-reliant house-
holds." Such a declaration entails a pledge to accept vocational 
education, employment guidance, etc. that would help uplift the 
household above its poverty status. Annual surveys are conducted 
to follow up on the current status of the poverty households, 
including the self-reliant households. The survey also includes 
households that have risen above the poverty line. The 1974 
survey showed that 7% of the members of the poverty households 
were chronically ill and 6% were physically handicapped. In 
contrast, the same two categories accounted for 4.1 o/o and 3.3% 
respectively of the self-reliant households, and the ratios were 
even lower - 2.8% and 2.6% respectively - for households that 
had risen above the poverty status. Furthermore, the proportion of 
persons "able to work" increased from 24% of the members of the 
poverty households to 32% in the self-reliant households and 35.5% 
in households that had risen above the poverty line. Sixty-six 
percent of those who were able to work in the poverty households 
were burdened by family misfortunes while about 14% were ill or 
disabled. The incidence of these two major reasons for poverty 
conditions declined to 60% and 8.7% respectively for the self-
reliant households and 51% and 7% respectively for households 
that had risen above the poverty line. Furthermore, among the 
members of these households that successfully escaped the 
poverty line, according to the same survey, 15.7% had complained 
about loss of employment or lack of employment opportunities 
and 131!;;J of lack of training or work experience. These statistics 
again indicate that the most effective means to eliminate poverty 
in Taiwan have been increases in employment and employability. 
Table 14 shows the percent distribution by type of aid under the 
anti-poverty program that has contributed to removing house-
holds from the poverty status. Family planning was credited with 
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26% of the program's success, followed by vocational training and 
employment aid, 24%; medical, surgical and emergency aid, 15%. 
Other single categories that have proved significant are family 
subsidy, 9%; housing improvement, 7%; and production and 
marketing aid, 4%. 
Once poverty households have found employment for their 
members, their income naturally increases. The 1974 survey 
indicates that the median annual income of such households that 
had risen above the poverty line was NT$25,763 (US $678). At the 
same time, the median annual income of the self-reliant house-
holds whose members had found employment was NT$19,534 (US 
$514). 
Table 14. Types of Aid Contributing to Removal of Poverty 
Status under the Anti-Poverty Program 
Percent 
1. Family planning 26.3 
2. Vocational training and employment aid 24.3 
3. Medical, surgical and emergency aid 15.2 
4. Family subsidy 9.0 
5. House improvement 6.7 
6. Production and marketing aid 4.3 
7. Other 14.2 
--
Total 100.0 
Source: Department of Social Affairs, Taiwan Provincial Government. 
More recently, Taiwan's anti-poverty effort has begun to focus 
its attention on households in certain specific occupations, 
notably the salt producers and segments of fishermen families. 
The anti-poverty program has also consistently included the 
aborigine households living in central Taiwan. The entire anti-
poverty program is a facet of income distribution that deserves far 
more attention and study. 
Comparisons with Other Countries 
Eastern Europe and Mainland China 
The experience of Taiwan in income distribution in relation to 
its economic policy and socio-political environment can be 
compared with that of mainland China and other communist 
countries, as well as with that of other non-communist Asian 
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countries, both developing and developed. In making the first set 
of comparisons, one's interest turns very naturally toward the 
PRC as "the other China," although brief reference might be 
made to some European communist countries as well. See Table 
15. 
Table 15. Income Share of All Households 
Per Capita Lowest Middle Top 
Year GNP !U.S.$) 40')1, 40'!i, 20% 
Yugoslavia 1968 529 18.5 40.0 41.5 
Taiwan 1972 503 21.7 39.2 :39.1 
Poland 1964 850 23.4 40.6 36.0 
Hungary 1969 1140 24.0 42.5 33.5 
Bulgaria 1962 530 26.8 40.0 33.2 
Czechoslovakia 1964 1150 27.6 41.4 :n.o 
Source: For Taiwan, see page 13 of text. For the East European countries, see 
Chenery et a!., Redistribution with Growth, pp. 8-9 
According to available estimates (mostly from U.N. sources) 
cited above, if comparison is made with several East European 
communist countries in the mid to late 1960s, Taiwan in 1972 
would find itself situated between Yugoslavia and Poland in terms 
of the income shares of the lowest 40% and the highest 20% of 
income recipients respectively. The same would be true for Taiwan 
in 1964. In a very general way one can speak of income 
distribution in Taiwan in 1972 as being slightly more "equal" 
than it was in Yugoslavia in 1968 and slightly less "equal" than 
in Poland in 1964. Yet, in contrast to both Poland and Yugoslavia, 
Taiwan is a market economy with ownership of private property. 
Because of inadequate official data from Peking, no such 
overall comparison of income distribution can be made directly 
between Taiwan and the Chinese mainland. However, several 
indicators can he used to make partial comparisons so that a 
plausible overall impression can nevertheless be inferred. 
First, regarding the income differential between the agricultu-
ral and non-agricultural sectors, we have already noted above the 
declining ratio between farm and non-farm family incomes in 
Taiwan in 1964-72. The ratio worsened in 1973, a year of 
unprecedented industrial boom before the oil crisis. See Table 16. 
However, if the municipality of Taipei is excluded, the 
corresponding differentials would be significantly lower: 1.23 in 
34 CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES 
Table 16. Change in Ratios of Farm and Non-Farm Family 
Incomes 
I. Average farm family income 
II. Average non-farm family income 
Ratio of 11:1 
1964 1972 1973 
(NT$ per annum, constant 
1972 prices) 
32,013 
32,740 
1.02 
49,090 
64,497 
1.31 
54,544 
81,373 
1.49 
As shown in Table 17, these income differentials are not 
significantly affected by comparing the average disposable 
incomes after tax.a 
Table 17. Average Disposable Incomes After Tax 
1966 1972 1973 
A. Average disposable income per 
farm household" 30,423 46,481h 52,123" 
B. Average disposable income per 
nonfarm household• 32,718 61,293h 77,394• 
Ratio of B:A 1.08 1.32b 1.48" 
Sources: (a) These disposable income estimates are calculated by Han-yii 
Chang, "Taiwan Ching-chi fan-chan kuo-ch'eng-chung so-te fen-p'ei chih fen-hsi" 
(An Analysis of Income Distribution in the Process of Taiwan's Economic 
Development), Taiwan Ying-hang Chi·k'an (Bank of Taiwan Quarterly), Volume 
26, No. 4, Taipei, December 1975, Tables 2-1 and 2-2, pp. 12-13. 
(b) Kuo, op. cit., July 1975, Table 13. 
1972 and 1.35 in 1973. This can be seen from the data for Taiwan 
Province (i.e., Taiwan excluding Taipei) in Table 18. 
When the average disposable income is calculated on a per 
capita rather than per household basis, the excess of non-farm 
household income would rise to 50% in 1972 and 65% in 1973. 
Apparently the larger size of the farm household made the farm 
sector even worse off on a per person basis. 
If comparison is made between the data for Taiwan including 
Taipei and those excluding Taipei, it is quite clear that the higher 
income households in the capital city make the income differential 
between the farm and non-farm sectors much higher than it would 
otherwise be. Furthermore, inclusion .of Taipei makes the 
worsening of the differential between 1972 and 1973 proportion-
ately somewhat greater (from 1.31 to 1.49) than it would otherwise 
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be (from 1.22 to 1.36). This phenomenon points to the greater 
concentration of higher income families in the capital. 
Table 18. Income Differentials for Taiwan Province 
1972 1973 
A. Average income per farm family 49,033 54,352 
H. Average income per non·farm family 60,010 7:~.957 
Ratio of H:A 1.22 1.36 
A. Average disposable income per farm 
household" 46,429 51,934 
B. Average disposable income per non·farm 
how;ehold" 57,022 70,318 
Ratio of B:A 1.23 1.35 
Source: (a) Chang, op. cit. 
1966 1972 1973 
c. Average disposable income per 
person in farm households 
Estimate (1) 4,244 7,140 8,153 
Estimate (2) 5,628 9,348 12,047 
D. Average disposable income per 
person in non·farm households 
Estimate (1) 6,206 10,776 13,472 
Estimate (2) 8,620 16,174 20,920 
Ratio of D:C 
Estimate (1) 1.46 1.50 1.65 
Estimate (2) 1.53 1.73 1.73 
Source: Chang, op. cit. Estimate (1) is based on Survey reports on family 
income and expenditures. Change also presents an alternative estimate (2) based 
on farm household accounts. 
While sectoral income disparity between agriculture and non-
agriculture, together with the greater disparity attributable to 
Taipei within the non-agricultural sector, plagues Taiwan as a 
distributional problem, as it does other developing countries, the 
disparity is by all counts even greater on the Chinese mainland. 
According to one American estimate, 25 the money income of the 
2ii Charles Hoffman, Work Incentive Practices and Policies in the People's 
Repulic of China, 195.1·65 (New York: State University of New York Press, 1967), p. 
13. 
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average mainland Chinese non-agricultural worker was around 
¥560 a year in 1960 or about four times that of the average 
peasant, thus inferentially making the latter's income about ¥140 
a year. While the -¥560 figure refers to the worker, the average 
annual income of the entire worker-employee (chih-kung, or 
worker and staff) group was ¥656 in 195826 and remained at the 
roughly constant level of ¥650 in 1971.27 (The official press 
compared this 1971 figure with that of 1952, noting that it was a 
50% increase, but omitted to compare it with the 1957 or 1958 
benchmark level.) It is not clear whether the average worker's 
income also remained stationary in 1958-71, although any 
increase that may have occurred could not be significant since the 
average of the numerically larger worker-employee group, which 
includes the numerically larger sub-group of workers, became even 
slightly lower, ¥650 instead of ¥656. 28 Peking's policy to keep the 
worker's income low is essentially intended both as a means of 
maintaining a high rate of capital investment and of keeping the 
income disparity between farmers and non-farmers within 
bounds. 
According to a British author, a survey of rural-urban income 
differentials in Kiangsu suggested that on the average the urban 
worker's income in 1957 was probably twice that of the peasant 
working on a cooperative farm. 29 Allowing for changes in the 
pricing of goods both bought and sold by the urban and rural 
workers, some narrowing of this differential may have occurred in 
the 1960s and 1970s. 
In two production teams whose accounts are used as 
illustrations in texts for training financial and accounting 
workers, the average per capita annual incomes of peasant 
households in 1971 were ¥-108 and ¥-139 respectively (Table 19). 
Other per capita figures given for both production brigades and 
26. The Ta Kung Pao (Peking), May 24, 1958. 
27. NCNA International (Peking), September 18, 1971. 
28. In his testimony on the allocation of resources in mainland China, 
Michael Field stated that 
The average wage of a worker in China now [1975] is about the same as it was 
in 1957, .... In real terms ... , so there has been no appreciable increase in 
the standard of living. 
In various times, e.g., 1967, 1968 and 1974, "There were demands for increased 
wages and for better times." See "People's Republic of China: An Economic 
Assessment" (A compendium of Papers submitted to the Joint Economic 
Committee, Congress of the United States, Ninety-second Congress, Second 
session, May 18, 1972), p. 72. 
29. See Christopher Howe, Wage Patterns and Wage Policy in Modern China, 
1919-1972 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 50-51. 
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communes in six geographically widespread areas, possibly for 
different years, vary from ¥94 to as high as ¥176 and are 
generally in the same order of magnitude as the two textbook 
examples cited before. Still other average annual farm household 
incomes in 1957 vary from ¥171 for Kansu province to ¥306 for 
Szechwan, ¥399 for Hopei, and ¥454 for Kiangsu.30 Depending 
upon the number of full-time workers and the size of farm and 
non-farm households, alternative ratios of non-farm to farm 
household incomes can be obtained as shown in Table 20. 
Table 19. Annual Income in 1971 
Per farm household 
Per farm worker 
equivalent 
Per capita 
A Production 
Team in 
Liaoning" 
475.4 
(in current yuan) 
369.7 (1.3 persons/house· 
hold) 
138.6 (3.4 persons/house-
hold) 
A Production 
Team in 
Hunanb 
432.0* 
108.0 
Sources: a. Department of Agricultural Economics, Liaoning Academy of 
Finance and Economics, ed., Cheng-yang Tso-hao Shen-ch'an-tui Ts'ai-k' uai 
Kung-tso, (How to Do Financial and Accounting Work in the Production Team 
Properly) (Shenyang: Liaoning Jen-min Publishers, 1973), p. 105. 
b. Hunan Revolutionary Committee, Bureau of Agriculture and Forestry and 
the Hunan Financial and Accounting Training Program, ed., Nung-ts'un Jen-min-
kung-she Sheng-ch'an tui K'uai-chi, (Accounting in the Production Team of an 
Agricultural Commune) (Hunan: Jen-min Publishers), p. 84 
*estimated. 
In spite of the inadequacy of data, one can probably conclude 
that the average income of non-agricultural households in 
mainland China in the early 1970s was about twice that of 
agricultural households and that it might be three to four times as 
large, if not more.:n The differential was in any case significantly 
larger than the current ratio in the Republic of China. 
30. See People's Daily (Peking), May 5, 1957. 
31. According to a U.S. Government analyst, "In 1970-71, industry-related 
production had caught up with agriculture-related production, and the 15 percent 
of the people in the urban areas were producing six times as much per capita as 
their country brethren." Although the differential between urban and rural 
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Table 20. Alternative Income Ratios 
(1) (II) 
Non-agricultural Household Household Average Agricultural 
Income 
Annual 
income per 
full-time 
workers 
(a) 
-¥650 X 1.5 
(b) 
2 
Income 
Assumed 
number 
of full-time 
equivalent 
workers per 
household 
(a) ¥- 975 
(b) ¥-1300 
Household Income 
1957 
(II) 
Kansu ¥171 
Szechwan 306 
Hopei 399 
Kiangsu 454 
1971 
Liaoning 475 
Hunan 432 
Ratio of 
(I) to (II) 
(a) (b) 
5.70 7.60 
3.19 4.25 
2.44 3.26 
2.15 2.86 
(a) (b) 
2.05 2.74 
2.26 3.01 
Within the agricultural sector, the pattern of income distribu-
tion among farm households was sharply altered in mainland 
China through the initial redistribution of land from former 
"landlords" and "rich peasants" to "poor peasants," accompanied 
by the reduction of farm laborers. 32 However, inequality has 
increased subsequently for several reasons. First, whenever 
distribution according to labor is the dominant form of distribu-
tion in the PRC rather than distribution according to need, 33 
inequality among households can come about as a result of 
unequal distribution of labor and skills among them. The relative 
emphases of the two forms of distribution have continued to be a 
incomes per capita is not the same as average non-agricultural and agricultural 
family incomes, this differential is in the same area of magnitude as estimates in 
the text suggest. Furthermore, it is also about double the ratio of the non-
agricultural sector and the agricultural sector in Taiwan in terms of per capita 
value-added in 1972 (3.18:1). See page 18 of text. 
The quotation is taken from Arthur G. Ashbrook, Jr., "China: Economic Policy 
and Economic Results, 1949-71," in "People's Republic of China: An Economic 
Assessment" (A compendium of Papers submitted to the Joint Economic 
Committee, Congress of the United States, Ninety-second Congress, Second 
Session, May 18, 1972), p. 41. 
Ashbrook also thought that the bulk of the new agricultural inputs had gone to 
the favored communes and brigades so that an important ideological controversy 
dealt with the contrast between "rich brigades" and "poor brigades." 
32. See Peter Schran, The Development of Chinese Agriculture, 1950-1959 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1969), for extensive calculations on changes 
in class and income distribution. 
33. "Need" is presumably defined by the party cadres rather than the income 
recipients. 
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matter of controversy for nearly two decades. Secondly, under the 
system of distribution practiced in 1971, each member of the 
production team is rewarded principally according to the number 
of work points he earns through labor. However, the value of a 
work point depends upon the total number of work points 
accumulated by all the team members and the net income 
available for distribution among them. The net income is, in turn, 
the difference between gross income and the aggregate amount of 
taxes, compulsory purchase by the state, production cost, 
collective consumption, collective investment, payment to the 
higher level production brigade, and addition to the team's 
inventory. Since these deductions are of fairly stable proportions, 
disparity in the gross income of different production teams is a 
source of disparity in income distribution. Differences in gross 
income occur regionally due to differences in soil, climate, and the 
nature of crops (e.g., industrial crops versus cereals). In 1957, 
among the four provinces of Kansu, Szechwan, Hopei and 
Kiangsu, the difference varied from 1 to 2.65. In the same year, in 
Shensi province, the range of variation among different agricultu-
ral regions was from 1 to 6.4. Similarly, the composition of 
agricultural production in terms of livestock, fruits, fishery 
products, and crops also varies among provinces, and changes in 
their respective procurement or market prices would affect relative 
income regionally. A final source of income disparity consists of 
differences in income derived from private plot and free market 
sales. 
Within the industrial sector, a rough comparison can be made 
between Taiwan and Mainland China in terms of income 
distribution in several ways. In the first place, the wage rate 
differential between the lowest and highest rates on an 8-grade 
scale employed in the PRC appears to be noticeably wider than 
the corresponding differential between unskilled and skilled labor 
in Taiwan's industrial sector. According to Peking's wage scale of 
1955, the highest wage rate (grade 8) was generally a little over 
three times that of the lowest. The corresponding ratio of the wage 
rate at grade 6 to that of grade 1 was generally around 2.2 to 2.4.34 
Some adjustments in wage rates have taken place since 1955, 
especially in the 1963 wage reform, but the differential may not 
34. See Charles Hoffman, Work Incentive Practices and Policies in the 
People's Republic of China, 1953-1965 (Albany, New York: State University of New 
York Press, 1968), Table 2, p. 21. 
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have varied greatly.35 In contrast, the wage differential between 
unskilled and skilled labor in manufacturing in Taiwan during 
1970 varied from a low of 1 to 1.43 in the cement industry to a 
high of 1 to 2.19 in the ebctronics industry.36 The Taiwan wage 
differential in 12 different manufacturing industries in July 1970 
can be seen from Table 21. 
Table 21. Average Monthly Wage in Taiwan (NT$) 
I II 
Skilled Unskilled Differential 
Industry Labor Labor I! II 
Clothing 3,090 1,590 1.62 
Synthetic fibers 2,960 1,760 1.56 
Motor cycles 2,930 1,130 1.96 
Cotton textile 2,600 1,420 1.83 
Cement 2,520 1,910 1.43 
Food Manufacturing 2,510 1,640 1.49 
Plastics 2,480 1,410 1.66 
Plywood 2,460 1,470 1.67 
Electric Appliances 2,340 1,660 1.50 
Pharmaceuticals 2,300 1,510 1.73 
Electronics 2,280 1,070 2.19 
Wool textiles 1,950 1,450 1.54 
Source: Chen Hsi-chao, "Taiwan Ti-ch'ii Ch'an-yeh Yuan-kung Yi-tung Yen-
chiu" (Turnover of Production Workers in Taiwan), in Li Ch'eng (ed.), Taiwan Jen-li 
Ts'u-yilan Lun-wen-chi (Essays on Taiwan's Human Resources), (Taipei: Lien-
ching Publications Co_, 1975), p. 484. 
What has happened in mainland China is a concentration of 
a far larger group of persons in the lower wage grade, and this has 
had the effect of yielding a very low income inequality. However, 
the average wage rate as well as the total wage bill have been kept 
very low through very high profit rates which are, however, 
appropriated by the State as a result of nationalization of 
35. Cf. Christopher Howe, Wage Patterns and Wage Policy in Modern China, 
1919-1972 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), p. 96. 
36. In mainland China the comparable ratios in 1955 were 2.19 (grade 6 to 
grade 1) and 3.00 (grade 8 to grade 1) in the cement industry and 2.22 (grade 6 to 
grade 1) and 3.04 (grade 8 to grade 1) in light industry as derived from Charles 
Hoffman, Work Incentive Practices and Policies in the People's Republic of China, 
1953-65 op. cit. There are also substantial regional differentials in industrial 
wages. See Howe, Wage Patterns and Wage Policy in Modern China, 1919-1972, op. 
cit., p. 52. 
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industry.37 Without attempting to construct income distribution 
estimates for all households in mainland China, which cannot be 
done for lack of data, especially in more recent years, one can 
probably safely assert: 
1. that income distribution in the industrial sector, as well as 
in the agricultural sector, shows a high degree of equality in the 
small geographical and enterprise units, but this is modified by 
regional disparity to a degree that we cannot determine; 
2. that there is a very wide differential between farm 
household and non-farm household incomes, the disparity being a 
great deal larger than the corresponding disparity in Taiwan; 
3. that the average non-farm worker's income (say at ¥650 a 
year, or approximately US$325) at the official exchange rate 
would yield more than $650 for a two full-time working member 
family, this family income being only 40% of the average non-
farm family income in Taiwan (about NT$64,500 or US$1,612, 
also at the official exchange rate). If the average mainland 
Chinese farm household has no more than one-half to one-quarter 
of the non-farm household's income, while farm family income in 
Taiwan is only 30% below that of the non-farm family, the farm 
family on the Chinese mainland would probably enjoy an income 
varying from 14 to 29% - which one can conservatively place at 
30%- of the corresponding farm family in Taiwan.38 
Finally, both Taiwan and mainland China grant subsidies to 
individuals and groups, thus altering the distribution of real 
income. In the case of Taiwan, the nine-year free schooling 
introduced in 1969 has probably benefited the low-income groups 
more than those of higher income. It has therefore contributed to a 
reduction of real income inequality in Taiwan, both in the short 
run and in the long run. While such subsidies also exist in 
37. Recent studies of Jung-chao Liu, State University of New York at 
Binghamton, have dealt with the comparison of wages and profits between China 
and India. 
38. If the non-farm family income in Taiwan is denoted by 100, the 
corresponding figure for mainland China, as discussed in the text, would be 40. 
One-quarter to one-half of the 40 would yield a figure of 10-20 as the corresponding 
value of the mainland Chinese farm family's income. If the Taiwan farm family 
has an income 30'!'o below that of the non-farm family, its income level can be 
denoted by 70. Comparing 10 or 20 with 70 we obtain percentages equal to 14.3 and 
28.6, respectively. Granted that such comparisons based on official exchange rates 
raise methodological issues, they are nevertheless illuminating as rough indica-
tions of orders of magnitude. 
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Communist China, the effect need not be the same and may even 
be in the opposite direction, either because the subsidies to 
different groups are not of the same quality -barefoot doctors do 
not provide the same medical service as the modem medical 
facilities in the cities - or because the subsidy is only granted to a 
certain group which may happen to be the higher income group, 
thus increasing rather than diminishing the income gap. An 
example of the latter genre is the low residential rent in cities, 
which benefits only the urban dwellers. Distributive justice in 
mainland China is often based on class origin in the pre-
communist period, thus departing from the criterion of current 
economic status. In Taiwan measures to modify income distribu-
tion do not contain an element of retribution. 
Non-communist Asian Countries 
An interesting comparison can be made between Taiwan and 
South Korea among the non-communist Asian developing coun-
tries. 
Both countries underwent asset redistribution in the agricultu-
ral sector through land reform. Both did not suffer from initially 
large inequalities in the distribution of assets in the non-
agricultural sectors inasmuch as Japanese-owned assets were 
taken over by the respective governments after World War II. On 
the other hand, the destructive Korean war had a further levelling 
effect in both the agricultural and the non-agricultural sectors 
from which Taiwan fortunately escaped. Like Taiwan, Korea also 
went through an initial phase of import substitution before it 
turned toward export promotion, and it was after 1964, especially 
in the 1970s, when the rapid expansion of labor-intensive exports 
began that, again like Taiwan, Korea entered a stage of very rapid 
economic growth. Largely because of the war, however, Korean 
agriculture did not enjoy the kind of rapid growth simultaneously 
with asset redistribution through land reform. Hence the initially 
equalizing effect of land redistribution was not compounded by 
growth. Furthermore, the disparity between farm and non-farm 
income in Korea might be widening more than it has done in 
Taiwan. 
In combination, these factors have given South Korea an 
income distribution resembling but somewhat more unequal than 
that of Taiwan. On the other hand, while there probably was little 
change in the Korean pattern between 1964 and 1970,39 there was 
39. See Irma Adelman on "South Korea" in Chenery et al., Redistri-
bution with Growth (Annex 1974), pp. 280-285. 
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continued improvement in the Taiwan pattern as shown in Table 
3. It is also possible that the available Korean data have 
underestimated the very large incomes. 40 In the absence of post-
1970 information and Korea's rapid economic and export growth 
since 1970, one cannot state unequivocally whether the Korean 
and Taiwan patterns of income distribution are now closer or 
farther apart than before. 
If comparison is made between Taiwan and India,41 a 
significantly greater income inequality seems to prevail in India.42 
This would seem to be attributable, inter alia, to the following 
factors: first, India has been unable to implement its policy of 
land redistribution which it has consistently advocated as an 
integral part of economic planning. The difference between the 
Taiwan and Indian experiences in this respect would seem to lie 
both in their disparity in size and in the political conditions facing 
the two countries. Second, India has not adopted a foreign trade 
orientation in its development strategy as has Taiwan. Nor has 
India followed an agricultural emphasis in its initial phase of 
development. Again, the very much larger size of the Indian 
economy and greater resource availability in comparison with 
Taiwan have contributed to the two countries' different ap-
proaches. Ideological differences between the political leaders of 
the two constitute another important factor. Finally, given its 
development strategy, it would be all the more important for India 
to resort to government measures to modify asset and income 
distribution. Yet for the same reasons as those that have stymied 
land reform, it seems that India has been unable to take sufficient 
and appropriate corrective measures to redistribute income. 
Taiwan, on the other hand, presents a contrasting experience. 
Because of the many resemblances the economic development 
of Taiwan bears to that of Japan, an interesting comparison can 
be made with Japan from the point of view of income distribution. 
First, according to the Japanese employment status survey, the 
Gini index of the agricultural sector increased from 0.3097 in 1962 
to 0.3470 in 1971 during a period of very rapid economic growth. 
40. See Hakchung Choo, Review of Income Distribution Studies, Data 
Auailahility and Associated Problems for Korea, the Philippines and Taiwan, 
Korea Development Institute, Monograph 7406 (1974). 
41. For a brief discussion on the Indian case, see Chenery et al., Redistribu· 
tion with Growth (1974), op. cit. 
42. Various estimates of income distribution data in India are given in 
Chapter III, "Economic Growth and Income Distribution," Economic Survey of 
Asia and the Far East, 1971, United Nations Publication E/CN.ll/1047, pp. 49-64. 
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On the other hand, income distribution in the non-agricultural 
sector became more equal during the same period, declining from 
0.3231 in 1962 to 0.3199 in 1971. These divergent movements had 
the net effect of reducing the Gini index of income distribution for 
all households from 0.3351 in 1962 to 0.3261 in 1971.43 The 
changes paralleled those of Taiwan after 1968 which we have 
previously pointed out. 
One of the reasons for the improvement in income distribution 
in the non-agricultural sector during this period of rapid growth 
was the disappearance of surplus labor, especially unskilled labor. 
On the other hand, among the factors working for greater 
inequality was an increase in the number of "non-standard" 
households, that is, households headed by single persons or 
persons either just entering or just retiring from the labor force. 
The last factor was partly a result of demographic changes in the 
age composition of the Japanese population and partly an 
outcome of migration from rural to urban areas, accompanied by 
the formation of separate households by young workers who tend 
to be poorer. In the agricultural sector, greater use of capital 
equipment, especially on the larger farms, had the effect of 
increasing the importance of property income. On the whole, an 
allegedly narrow distribution of property in Japan may also have 
had the effect of creating greater inequality. Lastly, the disparity 
in the rate of growth of productivity and earned income in 
agriculture verses non-agriculture also had the effect of widening 
income disparity between the two sectors. 
On the basis of Taiwan's experience as discussed earlier, the 
disparity of growth between agriculture and non-agriculture, the 
shift of rural workers to industry - although young Chinese 
women working in the export processing zones have not really set 
up separate households and are still regarded as contributors to 
the income of the farm households from which they have come -
and the gradual disappearance of labor surplus all bear strong 
43. These data are quoted in Richard Osamu Wada, Impact of Economic 
Growth of the Size Distribution of Income: The Postwar Experience of Japan, 
unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Hawaii (May 1975). Wada's study also 
presents an analysis of income distribution adjusted for various understatements 
of income. According to his data, there continues to be a widening of income 
disparity in Japan although the trend had slowed down during the latter phase of 
the 1956·71 period. The phenomenon noted above in the case of Japan is also 
discussed by Simons Kuznets as common to developed countries where separate 
households headed by young people, including many households of single persons 
who leave their parental homes early, tend to increase disparity in income 
distribution. See Simon Kuznets, op. cit. 
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resemblances to the experience of Japan. It remains, however, to 
be seen whether the distribution of property income in Taiwan 
will in fact become more unequal or whether governmental 
measures to modify distribution will succeed in offsetting this 
potential development. 

